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Abstract
As a large cocoa bean trader, Transmar group ltd. bought millions of dollars’ worth of beans relying on 
financing from a syndicate of banks. To monitor amounts of eligible collateral, the banks required Transmar 
prepare periodic borrowing base (BB) reports. At some point, Transmar developed a discrepancy in collateral 
recorded on the BB report versus the amount of funds borrowed. The case discusses how this discrepancy 
grew larger as many questionable and fraudulent entries were included on subsequent BB reports. The case 
is written from the perspective of Peter B. Johnson, head of Transmar’s European affiliate and son of CEO 
and founder of Transmar, Peter G. Johnson. In late 2014, Peter B. Johnson first learned about the deceptive 
practices being employed in preparing the BB reports. How will he react? The case is also rich in details 
surrounding the cocoa industry supply chain and history of cocoa production.
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A teaching note has been prepared for this case study. Interested instructors at educational institutions may 
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1. Introduction
In late 2014, Peter B. Johnson had a very important decision to make. He was a senior officer of one of the 
largest cocoa trading companies in the world, Transmar, which owned over $120 million worth of cocoa 
beans that were destined to be processed in factories and sold to companies like Hershey, Mars, and Nestle 
(Harper, 2019). He had just learned some troubling information about some deceptive financial reporting 
practices within the company and would need to decide how to react.
Transmar was founded and owned by Peter’s father, Peter G. Johnson in April of 1980 (Sterk, 2017). From 
1980-1990 Peter G. worked hard in his offices in the World Trade Center to build the company and establish 
Transmar as a recognized name in the industry. Peter G. was a family man and always dreamed of building 
a company his family would continue to own and operate for generations to come. By 1990, he had three 
children and wanted to be closer to home to spend time with his wife and children. It was at this time that 
he moved the company with its small staff of eight to Morristown, New Jersey (Southern District of New 
York, 2018a). Over the next 30 years, Peter G. worked to expand and build his cocoa trading business. At 
its height, Transmar was one of the world’s 10 largest cocoa processors with more than 350 commercial 
customers, including Hershey Co., Barry Callebaut, Mars, Nestle, Guittard Chocolate, Ghirardelli Chocolate, 
and others (Sterk, 2017).
In or about 2002, Transmar expanded into the European market with the formation of Euromar in Germany. 
Euromar not only bought beans, but also processed them into semi-finished product. Peter B. Johnson 
spearheaded this expansion and was the active manager of Euromar. Between 2002 and 2013, Transmar 
continued expanding globally as they pushed to become more vertically integrated within the cocoa industry. 
Transmar established cocoa butter and liquor-melting operations, built a new processing plant in Ecuador, 
and increased investments in other cocoa processing operations in New Jersey and other locations both 
within and outside of the US. All this was done with the ultimate goal of creating a global supply chain for 
cocoa and cocoa products (United States Bankruptcy Court, 2017). Transmar and its affiliates grew rapidly 
as Transmar competed for a top spot as one of the largest cocoa traders in the world.
However, Transmar got itself into trouble. Cocoa bean trading is an incredibly capital-intensive industry 
and requires traders to borrow large sums of money to purchase and move cocoa beans from ports in small 
countries on the west coast of Africa, halfway across the world to be processed and sold. In order to secure 
additional capital to support growth and remain solvent during financially stressed times, Transmar employees 
began manipulating the periodic borrowing base (BB) reports that their lenders required to be submitted. 
The manipulations were made to overinflate eligible collateral from which they would be allowed to draw 
upon to receive additional funds from the credit facility they had established with a syndicate of banks. 
What may have started as a few relatively innocent but perhaps questionable adjustments, quickly spiraled 
into progressively more fraudulent and illegal misrepresentations to deceive the banks and continue drawing 
on the credit facility. The deceptive practices got out of hand. The misrepresentations included on the BB 
reports led to the development of a sizable discrepancy in the amount of eligible collateral Transmar truly 
possessed and the amount claimed on the BB reports. This discrepancy is referred to as the ‘hole’ in the BB 
reports. No one within Transmar appeared comfortable with the deceptive practices but they had worked 
themselves into a tight spot and could not agree on alternatives. Transmar was reaching a breaking point 
and running out of options. It was at this time in late 2014 when Peter B. Johnson became aware of the 
manipulations to inventory on the BB reports.
Peter B. must now decide how to react to this new discovery. At its core, Transmar was a family company, 
one that Peter’s father had worked tirelessly to build. Peter was well aware of the financial strain the company 
was now facing. The company and its future legacy undoubtedly weighed heavily on him as he considered 
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2. The cocoa industry
Cocoa originated in South America in the Andes Mountains of Peru. For a more complete history of cocoa, 
reference ‘The history of cocoa’, section of the Appendix. The cocoa industry has evolved massively since it 
was established in South America over 3,000 years ago, but still looks strikingly similar to what it did then. 
In the ancient Americas, cocoa was often grown by slaves and enjoyed by the middle and upper classes. In 
2018, 65% of the world’s cocoa was grown in Africa (Table 1), amounting to 2.9 million metric tons per 
year. South America still produces a substantial amount of cocoa, but only amounts to 13% of the world’s 
total production or 605,828 metric tons per year (World Atlas, 2018).
Within Africa, the grand majority of cocoa is grown by impoverished farmers in Ghana and the Ivory 
Coast on their own private or shared lands. Some, however, is grown illegally on protected land owned by 
the government. Most African cocoa farmers have never even tasted chocolate. From the farms, the cocoa 
beans pass through the hands of many players in the supply chain before eventually being bought by co-ops 
at coastal ports where they are then sold to a handful of large cocoa trading companies. A more complete 
description of the cocoa bean supply chain is detailed in the Appendix, ‘The cocoa supply chain’ section. 
At any given time, there are only about 10 traders operating in the world, and all of the cocoa beans sold 
in Africa have to go through one of them. Traditionally, these traders have controlled world cocoa prices, 
regardless of what the farmers and co-ops are making. Of the 10 cocoa traders in the world, three hold the 
lion’s share of business. These three are Cargill, Barry Callebaut, and Olam.
2.1 Transmar
Transmar was a relatively new player in the cocoa trading industry. Unlike other major cocoa traders, Transmar 
initially focused almost exclusively on the trading of cocoa beans. Transmar purchased beans from around 
the world and sold them to chocolate candy makers like Hershey, Mars, and Nestle. By 2016, Transmar was 
one of the world’s largest cocoa traders, exceeding $80 million per month in sales (Harper, 2019).
In order to continue growth at such a high rate, Transmar was willing to pay higher prices for their cocoa 
beans and sell its products for less than companies like Cargill, Olam, or Barry Callebaut. In order to make 
this business model solvent, the company required a large quantity of throughput. The purchasing of such 
large quantities of cocoa beans required that Transmar rely on lending institutions to supply financing to 
the company to purchase the inventory, with the inventory itself used as much of the collateral before being 
sold. The revenue from sales was then used to pay down the operating loan (Harper, 2019). It was around 
September of 2011 that Transmar’s growth lead them to begin relying on the large syndicate of banks to 
provide adequate financing. The loan amount available to Transmar at any given time was based on the 
Table 1. World cocoa production in 2018 (World Atlas, 2018).
Country Production (metric tons) World production (%)









Dominican Republic 68,021 2%
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amount of eligible collateral Transmar had in its possession. Eligible collateral could exist in the form 
of cash, inventory, and receivables, among other assets. To monitor the amount of eligible collateral, the 
banks required Transmar employees to prepare and submit periodic borrowing base (BB) reports detailing 
the amount of collateral they had on hand. No matter who prepared the reports, the CEO himself was also 
required to attest to their accuracy.
Because Transmar operated at the upper levels of its borrowing limits, when the market experienced a surge 
in demand it was difficult for the company to buy as much as they wanted to capitalize on the upward trend. 
The cocoa buying and selling industry can typically be characterized as high risk-high return. In order to 
pay off debts, Transmar assumed massive amount of risk to purchase more beans on credit than their eligible 
collateral could support. This required the BB reports to be erroneously prepared to reflect greater amounts 
of eligible collateral on hand, creating the ‘hole’ in the BB.
3. The ‘hole’
It is difficult to know exactly how Transmar got into the trouble it was in, or who was to blame. As far as 
is surmisable, around 2009 or 2010, the former CFO, Dick Krysty failed to write up approximately 10,000 
metric tons of real sales of cocoa butter to Euromar which created a false butter long position at Transmar 
(Southern District of New York, 2018d). This created a situation where ineligible collateral was being stated 
as eligible on the BB report. This mistake became to be referred to as ‘the infamous Dick Krysty non-existent 
butter position.’ After this incident, it appears that as additional BB reports were completed moving forward, 
the non-existent butter position was not rectified. To make matters worse, Transmar began including other 
questionable entries on the reports. At some point along the way, a new set of records were created and 
kept in addition to the accurate or true records. This allowed Transmar to prepare falsified BB reports and 
continue to draw against the borrowing base to fill the collateral gap.
This practice was maintained to various degrees for up to 7 years, even after Dick Krysty’s departure and 
replacement by Thomas Reich as CFO. Reich recounted a conversation he had as the newly hired CFO with 
Krysty when the two of them went to lunch during Krysty’s last days at Transmar. Thomas claimed that 
Krysty unfolded all of his tactics used to keep the appearance of the BB in compliance. He detailed how 
‘circle’ transactions were periodically implemented to shuffle eligible collateral around Transmar and its 
subsidiaries. These transactions were rarely executed other than on paper with their only purpose being to 
inflate Transmar’s eligible collateral values before the submission of a BB reports (Southern District of New 
York, 2018e). As these tactics continued, the ‘hole’ became larger and larger, resulting in further justification 
of false borrowing in hopes of earning enough profits to fix the problem altogether.
4. The decision
After discovering the deceptive practices employed in creating the BB reports in late 2014, Peter faced a 
difficult decision. Transmar had not made a profit for the previous two years. At the time, widespread industry 
speculation pointed to future increases in cocoa demand due to growth in the Asian markets. As cocoa prices 
rose in anticipation, Transmar needed more money to invest in more product. The funding had to come from 
their bank syndicate, which required asking for additional advances. For the funds to be granted, Peter surely 
knew that the eligible collateral shown on the BB report had to demonstrate the ability to support further 
draws on the credit facility. With eligible collateral severely lacking, further manipulation of the BB report 
would be required for the funds to be received. If the speculation of increased demand proved to be accurate, 
additional profits from Transmar and its affiliates could then be used to fill the hole and rectify the situation.
However, if the speculation proved to be inaccurate and the cocoa market saw no such increase in demand, 
then the hole would continue to widen and grow ever deeper until the company’s deceptive practices would 
surely be brought to light, and Peter would be implicated in the deception. To avoid this implication Peter would 
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would jeopardize the financial viability of Transmar and most likely, his own company, Euromar, as the two 
companies were linked in business and had additional shared interests. Beyond financial consequences, this 
decision would undoubtedly have a lasting effect on Peter’s personal relationships with family, employees, 
and business partners and on his reputation in his community. Transmar had grown to such as size that at 
this point its demise would cause a tidal wave of pain felt within the entire cocoa industry. Many would 
have the potential to experience losses, not the least of which would be the cocoa farmers themselves at the 
beginning of the supply chain. Both Transmar and Euromar had worked to build a good reputation within 
the industry and had always been good stewards within their communities and within the cocoa production 
regions from which they purchased. The Johnsons were active members in their respective communities 
and were looked up to as a family of good character. Peter’s father had worked his entire career at building 
the company, allowing Peter himself to enter the industry and begin his European business adventure. The 
decision of how to act with the new knowledge of fraud within the company could not be taken lightly.
Peter must now decide how to act knowing whatever decision he makes has the potential to change his life 
forever. What will it be, Peter?
5. Follow-up statement
Instead of doing what I should have done, which was report those problems to the authorities, 
I provided ideas on mechanisms to fill a hole with assets that I thought were permissible under the 
credit agreement. That was the pivotal moment that I will regret for the rest of my life.
Peter B. Johnson (Harper, 2019)
Instead of making the banks and authorities aware of the problem with previous BB reports, Peter began 
actively participating in the manipulation of the reports. This is not to say that he did not take issue with the 
problem and find it alarming. Emails collected by the courts revealed many attempts to rectify the problem 
by eliminating false inventory. This is evident in an email written by Peter to the other chief officers of 
Transmar in which he stated:
Eliminate ALL of the fake inventory. Take more receivables from Euromar, even if they aren’t 
technically borrowable. Circle inventory through intermediaries if necessary. Take all the loans that 
Euromar has granted to various related entities onto Transmar balance sheet. But I repeat, there 
should be ZERO ZERO ZERO fake inventory in our end of month borrowing base and this must 
remain so going forward. (Southern District of New York, 2018c: 2)
Their efforts however, were in vain, as the hole quickly grew to greater proportions and Transmar continued 
to rely on falsified reporting to keep the BB in compliance with the amount of funds borrowed.
The ‘fraud scheme’, as it came to be known in the court records, snowballed into a massive hole. It became 
an open secret among the Johnson family and several other chief officers and employees in the company in 
charge of maintaining the financial books and preparing the BB reports. They talked about the hole and how 
it should be addressed frequently in email conversations documented by the courts. They often discussed 
among each other the best methods to ‘fill the hole’ and not raise alarm as each new BB report became due. 
According to court documents, the BB reports were falsified through such methods as: ‘(a) including collateral 
on the BB’s that Transmar no longer owned or that was stored under conditions that made it ineligible for 
inclusion in the BB’s; (b) including receivables on the BB’s for which Transmar had already been paid or were 
too old to be eligible for inclusion in the BB’s; and (c) engaging in ‘circle’ transactions, that is, transactions 
that involved the nominal sale of assets to amenable third-parties, in order to create the appearance of actual 
business and generate receivables that, on their face, could be included in the BB’s’ (Southern District of 
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6. The rest of the story
In 2014, speculation that Asian markets would begin to purchase more cocoa caused the price of cocoa beans 
to surge from $2,200 per metric ton to $3,435 per metric ton in December 2015. In order to make money 
on this forecasted increase in demand, reflected by the increase in price, Transmar needed to borrow more 
money. To be able to do so, under the direction of Peter G. Johnson, chief financial officer Thomas Reich 
submitted proposals to the bank to increase credit to around $400 million. The bank needed collateral, and 
Reich cited hundreds of thousands of dollars of fake inventory of cocoa beans in order to persuade them. 
With aid from both Peter B. and Peter G. Johnson the fraud scheme continued with the BB reports repeatedly 
falsified (Harper, 2019).
In 2016, William Yu who had begun taking over the duties of CFO and Nancy Pizzi, a senior staff accountant, 
who was in charge of keeping track of Transmar’s two sets of books, expressed worries to the Johnson’s 
and to Thomas Reich about the growing hole. Peter B. and Peter G. met together to solidify a plan to further 
cover up the fraud by continuing the practices of circle transactions and reverse invoices. They assured Yu 
and Pizzi that all would be well. This plan ushered in a time for Transmar that became increasingly turbulent. 
Nathanial Durant, who was an overseas officer of Transmar, was transferred to Transmar’s main offices to 
help with financial duties. He independently discovered the fraud and ardently disagreed with the Johnson’s 
decision to deepen it. Yu and Pizzi, who had been feeling the pressure from the decisions Peter B. in particular 
had been making, quickly moved to support Durant. Durant wrote an email to Peter G. requesting that Peter 
B. be fired and that a partial disclosure of the fraud be made to the banks. Peter G. seriously considered 
Durant’s plan including firing Peter B., but decided against it. He did agree with Durant’s decision of making 
a partial disclosure to the banks and moved forward to do so.
Peter B. considered this ‘suicide’ and after finding out, resigned from his role in the company. To make 
matters worse, the expected surge in cocoa demand in Asia never happened. In the first quarter of 2016, 
cocoa prices fell to $1,917 per metric ton (Figure 1), less than it had been before the speculation. Transmar 
was millions of dollars in debt and was sure to lose even more money on its physical purchase in the down 
market. As the market stagnated, combined with the effects of the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom, the 
collateral position of Transmar became further jeopardized. On December 31, 2016 after not being able to 
pay back the banks, Transmar filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. During the bankruptcy proceedings, 
it became very clear that Transmar was operating outside of the law.
The State of New York pressed charges criminally. Ultimately, Peter B. Johnson received a prison sentence 
of 30 months for his involvement in the fraud while his father and Thomas Reich received 36 months and 
3 months respectively (Southern District of New York, 2018f,g,h). No other employees within Transmar 
received any prison sentence. The fallout to the banks was astounding, with a combined loss estimated at 
$325.5 million. On August 7, 2017, the lenders sued Peter G. Johnson, Peter B. Johnson, Mary Johnson 
(Peter G.’s wife), Timothy Johnson (Peter B.’s brother), Thomas Reich, Richard Gary O’Connor, Nancy 
Pizzi, and William Yu. They were taken to court over the $325.5 million dollars of unrecoverable loans. 
Efforts to recover losses were largely unsuccessful. Table 2 displays the amount of outstanding loan balances 
to members of the bank syndicate at the time of the court case.
Cocoa farmers suffered as well because of the speculation and consequent drop in price. Because of the 
speculation, farmers in West Africa produced 500,000 metric tons more cocoa than in the previous year, much 
of which was undoubtedly grown illegally on protected national park lands. It is speculated that other traders 
bought this cocoa at a fraction of the normal cost. Consumers did not see a drop in the price of chocolate, 
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6.1 Lessons learned
The fallout of the fraud was devastating to all involved. The close-knit family company that Peter G. had 
worked so hard to build for all those years was completely decimated. The financial institutions involved in 
the bank syndicate lost hundreds of millions of dollars. Perhaps most devastating to the Johnson’s was the 
tremendous strain placed on relationships with family and friends.
The fallout was not isolated to Transmar and the Johnson family. As one of the top 10 largest cocoa processors/
traders, with over 350 commercial customers, including names such as Hershey, Mars, and Nestlé, the collapse 
of Transmar was felt throughout the entire cocoa industry from bean to chocolate bar. Without the expected 
increase from demand in Asia, cocoa prices were already suffering in 2016. Transmar filing for bankruptcy 
only further added to the shakiness of the market and downward pressure of prices (Terazono, 2017a). The 
downfall of Euromar as a large processor of cocoa beans into cocoa butter also contributed significantly 
to a severe shortage of cocoa butter in 2016 (Terazono, 2017b). This undoubtedly had negative short-term 
effects on the many companies that produce products from cocoa butter. In the long run, the exit of Transmar 





















Table 2. Transmar outstanding loan balance for members of bank syndicate (United States District Court 
District of New Jersey, 2019).
Lender 2016 Amount outstanding1
ABN AMRO Capital USA $76,478,750 $74,906,250
Societe Generale $62,982,500 $61,687,500
BNP Paribas $53,985,000 $52,875,000
Natixis, New York Branch $53,985,000 $52,875,000
Macquarie Bank $40,488,750 $39,656,250
Bank Hapoalim $31,491,250 $30,843,750
MUFG Bank $26,992,500 $26,437,500
Israel Discount Bank of New York $13,496,250 $13,218,750
Total $359,900,000 $352,500,000
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may have allowed for some smaller firms within the cocoa industry to experience some growth, especially 
within their physical trading departments. These firms capitalized on the demise of Transmar by filling the 
gap in cocoa trading brought about with the loss of Transmar’s throughput (Ionova, 2018).
Financing of these capital-intensive commodity trading/processing industries such as cocoa and coffee can be 
a risky business. Many of the large financial institutions that finance cocoa are also the same players involved 
in financing of other similar commodities. With total bank losses estimated at $352.5 million, the downfall 
of Transmar had a devastating effect on the financial security of these banks. Not only did the banks (and 
those employed by the banks) suffer, but also the industries they help finance. While these types of rippling-
effect-losses are difficult to quantify, they were certainly felt throughout the cocoa industry as well as other 
inter-connected industries. Those within the cocoa industry feared that financing would become scarcer. They 
also feared that to acquire the limited financing still available, they would be required to undergo increased 
scrutiny as well as submit to more costly safeguards put in place by the lenders (Terazono, 2017b). Again, 
while concrete estimates of costs imposed by the downfall of Transmar may be difficult to estimate, they 
are no less real and significant to those who remained in the industry.
The Johnsons were strong members of their communities and were well known and respected for their 
commitment not only among their business relationships, but more importantly to them, their friends and 
family. The letters of support that poured in and were submitted to the judge of the criminal case against 
them, depicted both Peter B. and G. as men of great character who took pride in being active in their 
communities and were respected within their communities. The Johnsons undoubtedly faced significant 
pressure to uphold their reputations. One thing became abundantly clear throughout the proceedings of the 
court case; the Johnsons are good people but in the end, sometimes, good people make very bad mistakes.
The Transmar fraud case was not a typically white-collar crime. While certainly the Johnsons made a good 
living, it does not appear that the fraud was set in place as a way to enrich themselves personally. Instead, 
the fraud appeared to be slowly set in motion, always with the intent that the ‘hole’ could and would be 
eventually rectified as markets stabilized and business progressed. Those involved in the fraud did not appear 
to plan out an elaborate ‘get rich’ scheme, but rather made difficult decisions as they were faced with them, 
which although were ethically questionable, they felt were justified to preserve the company and way of life 
of their employees and business partners. The preservation of their own reputations within their industry and 
communities would have also certainly played a role in the decisions they made. This case demonstrates 
how often unethical decisions within business are made on the margin, one choice at a time.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material can be found online at https://doi.org/10.22434/IFAMR2020.0064
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